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This submission includes two studies, based primarily on the use of historical archives, of the 
Afghan wars from 1978 and the Iraq War from 2003. Breeding Ground: Afghanistan and the 
Origins of Islamist Terrorism (2011) is a study of various layers of the Afghan conflict: the 
1978 communist coup; the 1979 Soviet invasion and America’s proxy war against the Soviet 
occupying forces in the 1980s; and the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. It shows how Islamist 
groups allied to the West against Soviet and Afghan communism turned into enemies of the 
United States, with consequences including the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George 
W. Bush’s retaliation against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq. 
Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan (2010) is an analysis of the George W. 
Bush presidency in terms of its “war on terror.” The books thus study the Afghan and Iraqi 
conflicts in the context of United States foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the 
interests, actions and motives of actors in the conflicts and the interactions between internal 
and external actors. The central argument is that these factors contributed to the development 
of a “culture of violence,” defined as that “condition in which violence permeates all levels of 
society and becomes part of human thinking, behavior and way of life,” and how this 
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Title of Submission:  
A Critical Study of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars: interests, motives, actions and the makings 
of a culture of violence    
Note on Style and Spellings:  
The two books accompanying this submission are published in the United States. This report 
follows the same style and spellings. Citations, where a specific chapter is already mentioned in 
a sentence, refer to the relevant page (or pages); where not the chapter numbers are in 
parentheses. Closing quotation marks are after punctuation rather than before. To conform with 
the style of the books, it is “terrorism,” … instead of “terrorism” , … and “culture of violence.” 
rather than “culture of violence”. Otherwise, Chicago-style citations are used throughout.  
Introduction:  
The two books in this submission study the Afghan wars (from 1978) and the Iraq War (from 
2003) and seek to address the following themes:  
 The Afghan and Iraq conflicts in the context of U.S. foreign policy during and after 
the Cold War  
 How the internal and external players interacted in each country and the wider 
consequences of their interactions   
 How the Afghan and Iraq wars created a “culture of violence” providing the 
conditions in which violent groups including “terrorists” could operate  
The submission examines the interests of great powers and possible motives behind their 
actions; how they contributed to conditions that turned Islamist forces previously allied to the 
West against Soviet communism into enemies of the United States; and the consequences ––the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on America, President George W. Bush’s retaliation against 
Afghanistan and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.   
I examine three main approaches which scholars have used one of to explain terrorism. The 
first is the rational choice approach, which argues that terrorist behavior is driven by 
deliberate, strategic choices made after the actor has considered a number of options. The 
second involves psychological analysis, emphasizing emotional forces that cause people to 
commit terrorist acts. Finally, structural analysis focuses on external causes such as 
economic, political and cultural factors.  
I argue that all three are valid methods of inquiry. It is possible to study the causes of 
terrorism by taking any of these routes, and I acknowledge scholars who have done so. 
However my attempt in this submission is to examine terrorism by emphasizing an additional 
dimension––that of how a “culture of violence” operates in a country affected by sustained 
conflict. As I discuss later in this statement, other scholars have interpreted the idea of a 
culture of violence in various ways. My proposition is that a long war often begins as a low-
level (internal or regional) conflict. It then leads to great power involvement and escalation of 
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violence, causing the breakdown of state institutions and thereby creating a power vacuum. 
Other violent players come forward to fill the void that leads to the rise of extremism. The 
concept of a “culture of violence” which I have tried to develop provides a more 
comprehensive approach to study war and its consequences in terms of terrorism.  
I define a culture of violence as that “condition in which violence permeates all levels of 
society and becomes part of human thinking, behavior, and way of life.” My chosen route of 
inquiry does not exclude any of the three main approaches mentioned above. It takes into 
account the interests, motives and actions of all players involved, avoiding difficulties posed 
by the contested nature of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist”––terms frequently employed 
as words of abuse against the enemy.  
Publications:  
Breeding Ground: Afghanistan and the Origins of Islamist Terrorism (Potomac Books, 
Incorporated, Washington, D.C., 2011). Foreword: Richard Falk (Princeton University and 
the University of California, Santa Barbara); approximately 80000 words excluding the 
foreword.  
Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan (Potomac, 2010). Foreword: John 
Tirman (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); approximately 60000 words excluding the 
foreword.  
The total length of the books is about 140000 words. This Supporting Statement is 
approximately 13700 words long.  
Breeding Ground is a study of Afghan wars since 1978––the year of the first Communist 
coup in Kabul. The book examines the period between the 1978 coup through the Soviet 
invasion and occupation of the country in the 1980s to the Soviet forces’ retreat in 1989; the 
civil war between Afghan factions and the rise of the Taliban as the most powerful force in 
the 1990s; and how these wars created conditions which led to the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the United States. “Afterword” is a brief look at the aftermath––events from the 
American-led invasion in October 2001 to late 2010. However, the main focus of Breeding 
Ground is on the U.S.-led proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s 
and the rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda in the 1990s.  
In historical terms, Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan is the sequel to 
Breeding Ground, starting with the events of September 11 and providing an analysis of 
President George W. Bush’s response. This book evaluates the Afghan conflict following the 
return of the United States in late 2001, the Iraq War from 2003 and the wider campaign 
known as the “global war on terror” against suspected Islamist militants.  
Genesis of the Publications:  
These books have come at the end of a long personal journey for me, more than three decades 
in fact. Early in my 23-year career in the British Broadcasting Corporation in London, I 
became interested in Afghanistan after the 1978 communist coup. I have since kept a close 
eye on the historical development of Afghanistan; and Iraq, particularly following the U.S.-
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led invasion in March 2003. I retired from the BBC in 2000, but my work continued at the 
University of Sussex (2002–2007).  
I also developed an interest in U.S. foreign policy when I worked for the federal government 
in Washington (1974–1977). These interests have continued to date. In the early 1990s, I set 
up the BBC bureau in Kabul and served as the corporation’s resident correspondent in 
Afghanistan following the Soviet Union’s military withdrawal from the country. It was an 
opportunity to gain first-hand experience in the field. Throughout my BBC career, I tried to 
understand events unfold and continued to gather information.  
During the fifteen month period as BBC Afghanistan correspondent, I was privileged to meet 
numerous ordinary Afghans and many significant players, who gave me the benefit of their 
knowledge in private conversations, often in very difficult circumstances and at considerable 
risks to themselves. In Kabul, I walked to places every day. I routinely met shopkeepers and 
traders, students and soldiers, and a disturbingly large number of severely wounded and 
disabled men, women and children, sometimes begging in the streets. A surprising number of 
them came from what we would consider “good” or “respectable” backgrounds in the Afghan 
context.  
Apart from my daily reporting job, I met ministers and officials, diplomats and intellectuals 
for off-the-record conversations that were most useful. They helped me absorb their thinking, 
fears and hopes. In one private meeting, President Najibullah acknowledged that the 
communist regime made serious mistakes, forcing Afghan people to take up arms and fight 
the government from the mountains (91).  
Reflected in the bibliography at the end of Breeding Ground (208), such conversations have 
contributed to the context for my books. As Afghanistan correspondent, my responsibility 
was to file daily reports about the war. Writing a book was not on my mind. My private 
conversations were frequent, sometimes on the general situation, sometimes about specific 
information. Where that information has been used to strengthen the text, I have mentioned it 
in the notes.
1
 It constitutes a useful, but not essential, part of my works.  
After the events of September 11, 2001, I spent five years as a DPhil student in the American 
Studies department at the University of Sussex (2002–2007). I conducted historical research 
in archives, mainly of Soviet and U.S. documents from the early 1970s to 2000s, declassified 
in recent years. Focusing on these archives extensively, the analysis attempts to explain the 
interests and motives of many of the actors in the Afghan and Iraq wars and the broader “war 
on terror;” their actions and possible factors behind; and consequences in terms of a “culture 
of violence.” The findings of my research on Afghanistan were first published by one of 
India’s leading think tanks, the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, in Occasional 
Paper #8, Dialectics of the Afghanistan Conflict: How the country became a terrorist haven, 
March 2008.  
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For example, chapter 4, note 10, page 34; note 19, page 35. Chapter 10, note 3, page 88; note 9, page 90; note 
11, page 91.  
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Although the books are based on academic research, their presentation is for the informed 
general reader. Their academic standing is reflected in the WorldCat list of libraries which 
have acquired the books. Most of them are university and college libraries in the United 
States, Canada, Britain and France. Breeding Ground looks at how Afghanistan became, and 
may remain, a haven for terrorism. Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan 
evaluates the legacy of the George W. Bush presidency in terms of the “war on terror.” It 
relies on a range of materials, with a more limited volume of official documents compared to 
Breeding Ground, but supplemented with evidence gathered by non-governmental and 
human rights organizations and official statements reported in the broadcast and print media.  
The Nature of the Research and the Research Methodology:  
The object of any research depends on factors such as knowledge in the existing literature on 
the chosen topic, identification of gaps in that knowledge and selection of any gaps to be 
filled. The nature of the problem influences the choice of the method of investigation. Simply 
put, taking an overview of the existing literature, finding gaps, deciding which gaps the 
researcher wants to fill and then attempting to do so is what a research exercise is about. 
Breeding Ground: Afghanistan and the Origins of Islamist Terrorism and Overcoming the 
Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan are the end result of work that follows this path.  
Research design:  
In studying these wars, my attempt was to understand the interests and possible motives of 
actors, their actions and consequences that led to the ethos of terror on all sides. For this, I 
have made extensive use of primary archival material that includes official Soviet documents 
on Afghanistan (The Cold War International History Project, a major project at the 
Smithsonian Institute’s Woodrow Wilson Center of Scholars, Washington, D.C.) and U.S. 
documents (The National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.).
2
  
My research for these books is qualitative, for I have analyzed words rather than quantitative 
data to understand and analyze the thinking and actions of various actors (Bryman 2008, 
366–399). Through archival analysis, I have attempted to explore how violence over a long 
period becomes a habit, part of the pattern of human thinking and the primary means of 
settling issues. In my research, the documents are analyzed gradually to construct a narrative 
that explains the evolution of a culture of violence as I have defined it––“a condition in which 
violence permeates all levels of society and becomes part of human thinking, behavior, and 
way of life.” Further, my research is inductive because it has a theory-generating property, 
explaining how in a culture of violence, where there are weak, ineffective or no institutions, 
terrorist groups find sanctuaries.  
Archival analysis appeared to me the most suitable route for my works. As mentioned before, 
my primary responsibility as correspondent in Afghanistan was to report news and writing a 
book was not on my mind. An attempt to conduct interviews afterward to research the topic 
would have been unlikely to be fruitful, not least because many of the actors mentioned in my 
works are no longer living; those who are living are few, living in different places and old. I 
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See Appendix A.  
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recognize that archives (official documents) may be embellished by their originators to suit 
their argument. However, it remains my view that even then these documents do reflect the 
interests, motives and actions of the parties concerned. They serve the purpose of my research 
well.  
The sources used in each book complete a triangle. Breeding Ground is an analysis of 
primary, secondary and tertiary sources. When I began researching, U.S. documents from the 
last two decades of the Cold War were available with the National Security Archive in 
Washington under the title “Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 19973–1990” (see 
Breeding Ground Preface, xxi–xxiii; Bibliographic Essay, 165–169); Bibliography, 203–
216). These documents give an account of the U.S. view of such major events as the 
overthrow of the last Afghan monarch Zahir Shah in 1973, the communist coup in April 1978 
and the subsequent upheaval in the country under an increasingly factionalized, repressive 
and unpopular regime in Kabul.  
The document collection also provides the basis for an account of the American perspective 
of the December 1979 Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter’s 
decision to support the anti-communist Mujahideen groups even before the Soviet invasion of 
that country and the escalation of the U.S. proxy war under the presidency of Ronald Reagan 
starting from early 1981. These and other declassified documents, released by the National 
Security Archive, include embassy cables, situation reports, intelligence biographies, 
confidential memorandums, official letters and reports on hearings. Further in 2003, the 
National Security Archive released the “Taliban Files”––documents covering the period from 
1994 to 2001, when the Taliban ruled much of Afghanistan. These documents provide 
insights into President Bill Clinton’s thinking and America’s business dealings with, and 
concerns about, the Taliban regime. Memoirs of figures such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus 
Vance and Robert Gates, who occupied senior positions in previous American 
administrations, also provide glimpses of official thinking and the decision-making process.  
My aim was to make use of wide-ranging sources. An important part of this effort was the 
collection “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.” Soviet-era documents in this and other 
collections were acquired from the Russian presidential archive after the dissolution of the 
USSR in the early 1990s, then translated by a team of experts into English before their 
publication by the Cold War International History Project of the Smithsonian Institution’s 
Woodrow Wilson Center in November 2001. The team of experts under the project director, 
Christian Ostermann, worked for several years to translate the documents before releasing 
them for use to scholars. The collections on Afghanistan that I have used include minutes of 
meetings of the Soviet Communist Party. Also, there are diplomatic cables, intelligence and 
situation reports from Afghanistan. “The KGB in Afghanistan” by Vasili Mitrokhin, the KGB 
archivist who defected to Britain with personal notes on a vast number of KGB files, was also 
useful. Mitrokhin’s detailed account informed me about the extent of the Soviet intelligence 
agency’s penetration into Afghan society and its effects.  
The importance of these documents cannot be underestimated for the overall balance of my 
research material. For the Soviet archives tell the essential version of the Afghan story from 
the other side during the Cold War’s final phase in the 1970s and 1980s. There is also an 
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Afghan side of history that is far more complex and is told in many voices, given the 
fragmented nature of the country. Other resources were useful here, among them: The Other 
Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, volume I, II & III, 
written by Ali Ahmad Jalali with Lester Grau (Sterling, VA: Military Press, 2000); The 
Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995); and my on- and off-the-record conversations with Afghans in the last 
communist government of President Najibullah and opposition figures in Kabul.  
In addition to these primary sources, I used a variety of secondary sources that include 
scholarly articles, books, commentaries, reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch etc. Among the tertiary sources, there are newspapers and magazines, Al-Jazeera, 
BBC, CNN and NPR.  
Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan follows the same triangular design and 
is based on archival analysis. Primary sources such as the neoconservative Republican 
Project for the New American Century (the basis for George W. Bush’s manifesto in the 2000 
presidential campaign), texts of the presidential debates of 2000 and 2004 and some of the 
most important speeches of President George W. Bush were available when I began writing 
this book in early 2008 (Bibliographic Essay, 171–174; Notes, 155–170). By the time I had 
finished the manuscript and it went to press, the Democratic Party candidate Barack Obama 
had become President in January 2009 and we had his speeches available, too. America’s 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the broader “war on terrorism” had been going on for 
several years, but the availability of official U.S. documents faced strict controls. There was, 
on the other hand, intense 24-hour media coverage, with both serving and former U.S. 
officials and military and counterterrorism experts offering their views. The Avalon Project 
of the Yale Law School had brought together official resources that were in the public 
domain under the title “September 11, 2001: Attack on America.” But from the early stages 
of the “war on terror,” independent information on civilian deaths, abductions, rendering and 
torture in custody of suspects was hard to come by.  
Some academics, along with non-governmental organizations, created archives that began to 
fill the information gap. For example, Marc Herold of the University of New Hampshire 
started the online project Cursor on the loss of life as the U.S.-led bombing of Afghanistan 
began; the American Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
ensured a steady flow of information on abductions, detention, torture and curtailment of civil 
liberties; and the work of Reprieve and Clive Stafford Smith, in particular on the 
Guantanamo Bay detention camp, was also useful.  
On the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the most important primary sources were the National Security 
Archive Briefing Book No. 234, The Curveball Affair, revealing details of how Western 
intelligence was misled into believing claims about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass 
destruction program; Britain’s ambassador to Washington Christopher Meyer’s letter to the 
Prime Minister’s Office at 10 Downing Street, revealing the ambassador’s conversation with 
the American deputy defense secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, on how Tony Blair thought he could 
cooperate with the Bush administration as Washington prepared to invade Iraq; and what is 
usually called Britain’s Iraq Dossier, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment 
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of the British Government” of September 2002. Among secondary sources, Alan Greenspan 
and Ian Rutledge on the significance of oil for America; reports of the Federation of 
American Scientists; on human rights, Amnesty and Human Rights Watch reports. Finally, 
tertiary sources such as articles in newspapers and magazines, as well as CNN, BBC, Al-
Jazeera and PBS.  
Review of the Relevant Literature:  
The topic of  my submission has three component areas: terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Each is old as a subject, but the three have seen a remarkable convergence following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on America.  
Terrorism: 
[See Breeding Ground, chapter 1, The Concept of Terrorism, 1–15; and chapter 2,  Culture of 
Violence, 17–21.]  
Terrorism and violence for political aims have occurred throughout history. Alexander the 
Great of Macedon (reign: 336–323 B.C.) and Genghis Khan (1206–1227 A. D.) expanded 
their empires through conquests using great violence. The Reign of Terror in France 
(September 1793–July 1794) was supposed to rid the country of enemies of the Revolution. 
That episode of history gave us the expression “terror.” It has become a widely used term in 
recent decades, dominating the public debate after September 11, 2001.   
In the first chapter titled “The Concept of Terrorism,” in Breeding Ground (1–15), I take an 
overview of the characteristics of the term “terrorism” and difficulties in coming to a 
consensus on a definition. Use of violence, or the threat of violence, to overthrow a regime or 
force a change of policy has gone on through the centuries. State violence, or threat of it, to 
control a population is also not new.  
I acknowledge in the first chapter that there is general agreement among scholars on the main 
properties of terrorism: use or threat of violence for political purposes, involving sudden and 
dramatic acts targeting civilians to gain maximum publicity and to generate fear and 
uncertainty far from the scene of violence. However, difficulties begin to arise beyond this 
point. What about those who exercise their right of self-defense, or who resist occupation and 
fight for self-determination? Many experts in Western countries emphasize the criminal 
nature of political violence which targets civilians. Others emphasize the right of self-
determination and resistance to occupation as motivating factors.  
My objective is to tackle issues such as these, arising from the subjectivity and selectivity of 
opinions given and actions taken. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United 
States has carried out offensive operations unilaterally far beyond its borders. American 
agencies, claiming to be acting under U.S. domestic law, have targeted to kill or capture 
alleged militant suspects within the jurisdictions of other states. Unmanned drones have been 
used with increasing frequency for attacks in which not only have people described as 
terrorists been killed without the normal legal process involving arrest, trial and verdict, but 
also innocent lives have been lost.  
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Such unilateral operations in other independent states are prima facie violations of the 
sovereignty of those states. Targeting individuals may undermine the lawfulness of those acts 
under the established conventions and treaties on human rights and treatment of people. 
Further, if a powerful state assumes the right to launch offensive operations in another 
jurisdiction claiming to act under its own legal system, surely that state also has an obligation 
to provide the same protections that exist under its own system. Otherwise, we have a 
situation where a state endowed with overwhelming military force will have a license to do 
what its likes without restraint.  
Law, domestic or international, must have the backing of moral force. Or the legitimacy of 
actions taken is gravely jeopardized and the line separating what is considered lawful in war 
and terrorism becomes blurred. Law must seek to follow the principle that equals are to be 
treated equally, with the objective of common wellbeing. Or might becomes right––a state of 
affairs which humankind has struggled to change.  
The question here is not so much about who are designated terrorists and who chooses the 
“terrorist” and “terrorism” labels. The essential question is about the above-mentioned 
properties of violence, the manner of its use, and how it affects victims. Terrorism needs to 
be studied from the viewpoint of victims rather than the viewpoint of those who choose the 
term to suit their actions. For if the perpetrator is also the judge, the debate will remain 
inconclusive. These are some of the considerations that guide my works.  
In the existing literature, official and academic definitions of terrorism are offered by 
governments and scholars respectively. There are occasions when these definitions seem to 
overlap. The American State Department offers the most influential of the many official 
definitions of terrorism. It describes terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (U.S. Code; Wilkinson 2011, 3). The 
definition holds sub-state groups or individuals responsible for terrorist violence. The term 
“terrorist group” under this definition means “any group practicing, or significant sub-groups 
that practice, international terrorism.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines 
international terrorism even more broadly as “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a 
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state” (FBI 
1998, ii).  
Following on, the United Kingdom defined terrorism as the use or threat of action designed to 
influence the government, or an international governmental organization, or against a person 
or property (UK Terrorism Act 2000, Section I). It includes action in and outside the United 
Kingdom. 
Simply put, the United States, the leader of the industrialized world, and its allies represent 
the status quo in an increasingly globalized world. They take the view that any source of 
destabilization of the international environment is dangerous and must be dealt with (Celmer 
1987, 1–4). Some countries in the developing world who have gained independence after 
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liberation wars view political violence as a legitimate means to achieve justice while 
describing powerful states as adopting terror tactics to suppress people. Hence, terrorism is a 
weapon of the weak, but it can also be a weapon of the powerful.  
Among academics, Paul Wilkinson has said that a significant characteristic of contemporary 
ethnic insurgencies is “the widespread use of terror both by insurgents and by the counter-
insurgent regimes and military and paramilitary forces” (Wilkinson 2011, 8). In theory, this 
sounds fine, but who is a terrorist, and in what circumstances, is a bone of contention. Walter 
Laqueur says that “terrorism is violence, but not every form of violence is terrorism. 
Although difficult to define, terrorism is not a synonym for civil war, banditry or guerrilla 
warfare” (Laqueur 1999, 8). In fact, banditry, robbery, extortion and blackmail are all tactics 
which have been used by terrorist groups to finance their activities. Civil war or guerrilla 
warfare are often associated with tactics described as terrorist acts.  
Overall, the balance of argument suggests bias against sub-state insurgent groups and pariah 
states engaged in suppression at home and aggressive behavior toward outsiders. Two 
regimes may employ violence that looks similar. However, a friendly regime may not attract 
the “terrorist” label, the adversary almost certainly will. This makes any discussion highly 
subjective and political. The maxim “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” 
summarizes the classic dilemma. Since the League of Nations first attempted to find a 
commonly agreed definition of terrorism in 1937, success has eluded us in finding an 
internationally agreed definition of the term.  
Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman collected 109 different definitions of terrorism (Schmid 
and Jongman 2005, 5).
3
 In their database, they identified 22 word categories, so many of the 
definitions were quite close to each other. The main obstacle in reaching agreement on a 
common definition is a clash over what is seen as the motivation of actors––terrorism or 
liberation struggle; criminal act or war; whether it is non-state group or state behavior; in 
what circumstances; or whether preventive defense is legitimate defense or terrorism––as 
Israel has used for a long time and the United States has done especially after the September 
11, 2001 attacks.  
Schmid noted at a conference in 2011 that most of the research in recent years has focused on 
a fairly narrow base, involving those who have become “terrorists.”
4
 A consequence of this 
has been that studies of the origins or root causes of terrorism have suffered in the last 
decade. Tackling terrorism and political violence has become a matter of security and law 
enforcement, at the expense of looking at the wider environment in which violence can set in. 
It lends support to the view of terrorism as violent sub-state group activity amounting to 
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Word categories in Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. 2005. Political Terrorism. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers. Table 1.2. Most frequently used words are: violence, political, fear or terror, threat, effects and 
reaction, victim-target differentiation, planned, strategy and tactic, extra normality, coercion, publicity, random, 
civilians, intimidation, innocent civilians, group, symbolic aspect, unpredictability, covert nature, repetitive, 
criminal and demands made on third parties.  
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Alex Schmid gave this lecture at 11
th
 International Conference: World Summit on Counter-Terrorism 
(Herzliya, Israel, available http://vimeo.com/29558178), 17:00 minutes.  
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criminality that must be dealt with force. In the absence of solutions to political problems like 
the Palestinian-Israel conflict and Kashmir, such disputes lead to sharper polarization among 
government and non-government entities and stronger counterterrorism measures, often 
without serious examination of wider causes.  
Although the United Nations has still not agreed on a definition of terrorism, Schmid came 
out with a revised “consensus” definition arrived at in a group of academics. That definition, 
nearly 600 words long to accommodate many views, highlights the following:   
Direct violent action without legal or moral restraints targeting mainly civilians and non-
combatants … illegal state repression or propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in 
times of peace or outside conflict zones … illicit tactic of irregular warfare … hijacking, 
kidnapping and hostage-taking … threat-based communication … victims not the ultimate 
target … immediate intent to terrorize, destabilize, compel, demoralize or provoke … to 
redress alleged grievances, revolution, national liberation, or promotion of ideological, 
political, social, national or religious causes (Schmid 2011, 86–87).
 
   
Several problems can be identified even with this definition. It is too long and there is still no 
international agreement about it. The aspect of fear-generating coercive political violence 
without legal or moral restraint is not limited to sub-state groups or individuals. Wars of this 
kind have been fought by states, not only belonging to the outlaw category, but by other 
states, too. Guerrilla war is essentially irregular warfare, often justified by the groups 
involved as legitimate resistance, or supported by states for the same reason, though the real 
motives of those states may be geopolitical. Threat-based communication (for example, the 
concept of “shock and awe”) is part of modern warfare, which is not fought in trenches, but 
in populated areas by manned and unmanned aerial vehicles; innocent civilians are victims 
and communication of fear to wider population not to cooperate with, or support, the other 
side cannot be separated; there is 24-hour television and online coverage. Dread, panic, chaos 
and anxiety are part of all organized violence, regular or irregular.  
It is said that direct victims are not the ultimate target of terrorism. The same applies to what 
is described as collateral damage, including dead, wounded, internal and external refugees in 
regular warfare. Collective punishment can be meted out on large sections of population in 
both state and non-state violence. So how to separate terrorist violence from “regular” 
warfare? Not only is there a need to focus on the properties of violence with political 
motives, but also to ensure that the impact of those properties on victims is taken into account 
in any definition. Whether the perpetrator of violence had the intention to harm or threaten 
innocent people raises some of the most complex questions. When, and how many times, is it 
right to believe the perpetrator’s explanation that harming or threatening the innocent was not 
the intention? When does believing someone whose violent acts repeatedly cause “collateral 
damage,” or inflict collective punishment on a population, amount to impunity? And where 
does a state engaged in war stand with regard to its duty to protect innocent civilians? Then, 
there is the question of fear generated by modern warfare techniques in the general 
population. In attempting to define terrorism, our approach has to have moral force and must 
be applied consistently.   
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Finally, Gerard Chaliand (Chaliand and Blin 2007, 6) committed himself to the idea of 
terrorism as something close to a war instrument when he said:  
A tool as old as warfare. Today’s terrorism is what specialists call ‘bottom-up’ terrorism, 
but top-down (state) terrorism has been far more prevalent. In terms of victims, ‘top-down’ 
terrorism has taken a vastly higher toll than its ‘bottom-up’ counterpart.
 
 
The continual argument about what constitutes terrorism and the term “terrorist” is discussed 
in some detail in the first chapter of Breeding Ground. I am inclined toward the view that if 
the aim of violence, real or threatened, is to force an individual, group or state to change their 
policy, or to surrender, then all violence must involve a degree of terror. But a general 
acceptance of this principle leaves the right to defend oneself , or to end tyranny, without 
protection. Some scholars thus maintain that those who assert that all terrorism is the same 
are wrong (Held 2004). Tyranny or threats to oneself are real in many situations, but in other 
scenarios, when a threat is perceived, the arguments are far from clear.  
I have suggested a carefully worded definition of terrorism (Breeding Ground, 14). It seeks to 
cover the basic properties of political violence involving terror, irrespective of who the actor 
is––an individual, a non-state group or state.    
Terrorism is the premeditated use of violence by an individual, group, or state to 
achieve political goals; it is intended to generate shock and panic in the short term 
and long-term uncertainty beyond the actual scene of violence, to compel the 
existing political order to change policy, or to surrender in the face of sudden and 
disproportionate force. Once the consequences of violence are established, threat of 
repeating similar acts can be sufficient to terrorize the target.
5
  
Culture of Violence:  
The first chapter of Breeding Ground also has a review of how scholars have attempted to 
explain the causes of terrorism. Three principal approaches are examined. They are––rational 
choice, arguing that actors choose violence after carefully considering a range of available 
options (Crenshaw 1990); psychological factors (Post 1990); and structural or external causes 
(Ross 1990).
6
 I agree with other scholars in that it is possible to study terrorism and political 
violence by one or other of these approaches. However, I argue that the three approaches 
mentioned above are not suitable for the purposes of my research (14–15). Therefore in the 
second chapter titled “Culture of Violence” (17–20), I develop a new concept of “culture of 
violence,” defined as follows:   
A condition in which violence permeates all levels of society and becomes part of human 
behavior, thinking and way of life.  
                                                                        
5 
This formulation about the threat of violence in the last sentence is necessary to avoid confusion due to empty 
threats or pranks and to bring real, credible threats into the definition.  
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All in Walter Reich (editor). 1990. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. 
Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson International Center/Cambridge University Press.  
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I further suggest that once this condition has been established actors have acquired a habit of 
using force and both perpetrators of violence, and victims, expect solutions to be found 
through violence. There are advantages in approaching the subject of terrorism in this way. 
To begin with, provocative language is avoided. It is difficult for one side to blame others––a 
tendency that too often leads to accusations and counter-accusations and negative debate. It 
goes beyond the existing approaches to the study of terrorism. Above all, the concept of 
“culture of violence” I have developed allows a recognition of how all actors contribute to 
that condition. Although my submission looks at Afghanistan and Iraq, this approach can be 
helpful in studying other long conflicts, too.   
Indeed, other scholars have produced studies on “cultures of violence” that they have 
explained differently. Christian Gerlach used the term “extremely violent societies” where 
various population groups become victims of massive political violence, in which diverse 
social groups, acting together with organs of the state, participate for a variety of reasons 
(Gerlach 2010, 1–2). The idea has also been invoked to describe societies, for instance the 
United States, with lax gun laws combined with a high frequency of violent incidents 
(Zimring and Hawkins 1999; Chasin 2004). Conditions in which a high number of children 
are raised in single parent families, in many cases due to domestic violence, can result in 
violent adults who have suffered deprivation and neglect, having been raised in the absence 
of a role model and without training in how to develop interpersonal relationships (Buzawa 
and Buzawa 2003) have also been described in these terms. In certain societies where poverty 
is extreme or the gap between rich and poor is wide, lawlessness and crime are rampant. In 
others, the state does not have the necessary resources to run effective policing and judicial 
systems or state officials are corrupt, so there is a sudden loss of confidence and people take 
matters into their own hands. Insurgencies that challenge the state can break out (Hironaka 
2005). Or the state can resort to extreme force to suppress people rising up in opposition. 
There are communities in which violence against women is endemic. All of these conditions 
are ones in which cultures of violence have been invoked as explanations.  
There can be little doubt that certain basic human requirements, if fulfilled, can keep 
individuals, groups or nations from violence. Abraham Maslow’s pioneering work offers his 
famous hierarchy of human needs: from water, food, shelter through safety, job, love and 
belonging to self-esteem and achieving one’s potential, even reaching higher spiritual levels. 
Other scholars have followed Maslow, offering their need-based perspectives on violent or 
peaceful human behavior. Such needs differ according to each situation. Scholars refer to 
cultures of violence to explain the causes of violent behavior and to propose ways of building 
cultures of peace in differing scenarios (Staub 2003). In his work, Ervin Staub has focused on 
security, “positive identity,” and a sense of effectiveness as some of the essential ingredients 
of a peaceful culture. Other needs he has mentioned are people’s wish for connecting with 
each other and for transcendence.  
Others, however, offer a different perspective. They argue that, in stateless societies, coercion 
is privately provided rather than by the state system. Violence can be used to engage in, and 
to defend against, predation (Bates, Grief and Singh 2002). Their main thesis is that where 
the state does not have a presence, organized violence provides order. Violence can be useful 
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in protecting people’s property rights and agents of coercion are rewarded for fulfilling this 
role. Bates, Greif and Singh have developed a model of a stateless society, in which “people’s 
rights to the product of their labor are secure only if they possess coercive abilities” (600). To 
this end, communities in stateless environments are willing to trade off production and 
protection (624).   
Studies on cultures of violence by this or any other name refer to a range of causal factors 
which can be examined in conjunction with strategic (rational) choice, psychological or 
structural analysis. Most of these factors have to do with the basic needs of food, water and 
shelter; or higher psychological requirements of security and job; sense of belonging and self-
esteem; self-actualization; and beyond to some higher spiritual levels; or the psychological 
need for revenge, based on negative ethno-religious emotions. There are more external 
factors such as availability of weapons, lack of governance due to weak or nonexistent state 
institutions or excessive state coercion.  
In a pioneering work, Kalyvas (2006) examines the causes and micro-dynamics of civil wars 
and shows that violence in an internal war is neither a product of irrational behavior, nor is it 
driven by longstanding ideological rivalries. Instead, he sees violence as rational, the end of a 
process by which political and civilian actors seek to fulfill their interests within their space. 
Safety and welfare of individuals and close relatives are interests of utmost importance. To 
ensure these, “many people prefer to join the rival actor” rather than face the prospect of 
death (160). Armed groups in civil conflicts eventually recognize that indiscriminate violence 
is against their interests, so they engage in selective violence. It involves rational decision-
making on the part of armed actors, but also pushes civilians to make their own strategic 
choices. For selective violence is based on gathering information.  
Hence selective violence becomes a joint process, undertaken together by an armed gang and 
civilians who cooperate within the space in the armed groups’ control (209). The size and 
strength of each group, as well as the information it receives, usually determines the area it 
will control. The implication is that when two militias have parity, there will be no selective 
violence as long as that condition exists. Kalyvas’ micro-level analysis helps clear the 
confusion that often makes it difficult to understand what looks like a “war of all against all.” 
For his study demonstrates that an “internal war” is actually a complex web of many 
conflicts, each of which has its own players and dynamic. However, his method creates a 
difficulty in a country like Afghanistan and Iraq, where external powers are involved. Here 
external intervention (foreign forces or weapons or both) has the effect of changing the 
balance of power in an “internal war” and escalates the cycle of violence. The question 
therefore arises whether it is an “internal war” any longer. In Afghanistan and Iraq, there 
were groups at war with each other, but often they were also proxies of outside powers and 
sometimes changed their allegiances because of external influence.  
In fact, Kalyvas’ analysis is tested in Greece when that country was under German 
occupation during the Second World War (248–249). He acknowledges the lack of reliable 
fatality figures for the entire period of the Greek civil war (1943–1949), because the civil war 
was intertwined with foreign occupation (German control did not end until September 1944). 
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But he asserts that his study does nevertheless fall under the definition of “civil war” (5).
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Further, Kalyvas’ focus on “selective violence” suggests that more work would need to be 
done on large-scale and seemingly indiscriminate violence in territorial entities significantly 
greater in size and population.  
My submission seeks to be a critical study of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in a wider 
context. The two books attempt to show how internal or local conflict attracted great power 
involvement toward these countries; outside intervention contributed to escalation and led to 
the breakdown of what state institutions there were; and how internal and external actors 
interacted to produce a “culture of violence” in which violent groups found sanctuaries. 
Having prevailed over the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the United States, which had 
thereby become the world’s only military superpower, returned, seeking to dominate the 
region after the September 11, 2001 attacks. I attempt to provide a new synthesis of the 
Afghan and Iraq wars in the context of U.S. foreign policy.  
My thesis seeks to demonstrate that in a lengthy war local violence, leading to the 
involvement of external forces, contributing to an intensification of conflict, and weakening 
or destroying state mechanisms of public order, creates a “culture of violence” in which 
violent groups find safe havens.  
Afghanistan:  
[Also see Breeding Ground, Bibliographic Essay, 165–169 and Preface, xvii–xxiii.]  
My case is that historically Afghanistan has been a potential breeding ground for conflict due 
to a number of factors, not least its location. It has formed a buffer between competing 
empires and great powers in Central and South Asia. From the early eighteenth century until 
the end of the Second World War in 1945, the competition was between the British and 
Russian (later Soviet) empires, and then between the Soviet Union and the United States.  
Living often in isolated communities lacking in communication and transportation, Afghans 
have developed an inbuilt distrust of others and a determination to resist outsiders for 
survival. But Afghanistan is a desperately poor country, dependent on foreign aid. Afghans 
want help from outsiders, but will not accept external forces controlling their communities. 
These conflicting interests have caused wars through centuries. But particularly aggressive 
intervention by the Cold War superpowers, together with internal conflict, beginning in the 
early 1970s contributed to an increasingly stubborn “culture of violence.” Successive phases 
of conflict over two decades beginning with the 1973 overthrow of the monarchy with 
Soviet-oriented Afghan army officers’ support caused the destruction of the state system and 
its institutions. New forces emerged to fill the vacuum, resulting eventually in the rise of the 
Taliban, who offered sanctuaries to foreign groups such as al Qaeda. Once established, the 
culture of violence provided a space for terrorism within and enabled the export of the 
phenomenon beyond Afghanistan’s borders.  
                                                                        
7 
Kalyvas defines civil war as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between 
parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities (his emphasis). See p. 5.  
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Scholars have noted the inhospitable mountainous terrain of Afghanistan that is ethnically 
divided and where an overwhelming majority of the population lives in the countryside. It 
makes Afghanistan a highly decentralized society, with many independent ethnic and tribal 
groups. Pashtuns, concentrated in the south and east, are the largest and politically dominant 
group, organized around tribes. Non-Pashtun ethnic groups are mostly spread over in other 
parts of the country. Feuds are common (Vayrynen 1980, 93–102; Rubin 2002). As a 
distinguished American scholar of Afghan history, Louis Dupree, observed way back (1973, 
248–251), sustained relations with the outside world have rarely been pleasant. Afghan 
villagers cannot believe that central and provincial governments, local or foreign technicians 
will introduce permanent reform. For they know that “modernization” teams have gone after 
a short period, or abortive attempts, and things have gone back to what they were before.  
A scholar with a lifelong commitment to studying Afghanistan, Dupree is accurate and 
refined in his analysis of the characteristics of Afghan society. What is somewhat missing is a 
diagnosis of what has consistently played a role in ensuring that the “extractor” leaves 
eventually. My interest in the country for more than three decades suggests that Afghans are 
typically generous toward outsiders, but foreigners who try to control them do so at their 
peril. An outsider making a forced entry, or overstaying Afghan welcome, can expect harsh 
treatment. It may not be a unique trait, but is quite pronounced among the Afghan people. 
Past repetitions of history have reinforced this trait.   
My argument is that a country that has been subjected to external invasions and which has 
very limited resources tends to be dependent on outside help and, at the same time, displays 
an inbuilt quality to resist. That is why the Afghans have accepted foreign aid, resisted 
overbearing foreign influence and played off external players against one another (Hyman 
1992, 39–51; Dil 1977, 468–476; Ramazani 1958, 144–152; Segal 1981, 1158–1174). This 
was clear in the early period of the Cold War from around the mid-1950s. While Hyman and 
Segal have emphasized the significance of the race for influence in Afghanistan between 
Moscow and Washington, a race that the Soviet Union had won by the 1970s, Segal points 
out that China was not happy with that outcome after the Sino-Soviet split opened up in the 
late 1950s. Yet bilateral relations remained “positive,” and “limited trade pacts” were signed 
between Beijing and Kabul (Segal: 1161). But Afghanistan’s significance diminished 
gradually as China’s ties with Pakistan and the United States grew and their relations with the 
USSR deteriorated. By the 1979 Soviet invasion, less than two years after the communist 
takeover in Kabul, China was part of the Western alliance in the Afghan conflict.  
Dil’s analysis of the Kabul government’s ways of managing its foreign relations is correct. 
However, he overstates his conclusion that the 1973 coup by Daud Khan, in which Daud 
ousted his cousin King Zahir Shah and abolished the Afghan monarchy, was at the “expense 
of both American and Chinese interests” (476). The United States and China had made a 
deliberate preference for Pakistan instead of Afghanistan by the early 1970s. While a major 
reason for Daud Khan to stage the 1973 coup against the king was his humiliation after being 
removed as prime minister a decade before, the United States had made a clear choice in 
favor of Pakistan and China as Cold War allies against the Soviet Union well before.  
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The reasons behind Afghanistan’s struggle for much needed assistance, how the Kabul 
regime went about in its search for foreign aid and friends and what transpired, all leave 
further scope to study the impact of geopolitics on the Afghan War. Daud’s aggressive push 
for modernization in the Afghan republic alienated communist as well as religious groups. It 
triggered internal conflict in the country and started a long sequence of violent events 
involving intervention from outside. The growing body of U.S. and Russian archives from the 
Soviet era (1991, 2001, 2002, 2003) provided me with useful material to explore how it 
happened.  
Almost four decades after Dupree’s seminal work on Afghanistan was first published, a new 
study of comparable depth has appeared. Its author, Thomas Barfield, a Princeton University 
anthropologist, has also devoted many years studying the country. Barfield (2010) has 
provided a general survey of the land now known as Afghanistan, particularly focused on the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He has untangled some of the contradictions of Afghan 
society that outsiders find perplexing: a land repeatedly invaded but known as the “graveyard 
of empires” after forcing the withdrawal of foreign invaders; how it is easier to topple a 
regime in Afghanistan than to eliminate resistance and complete the conquest; and the failure 
of foreigners to introduce change in Afghan politics and social structures.  
A country so disparate in its landscape, peoples, their cultures and interests is extremely 
vulnerable, but it refuses to disintegrate. Barfield’s main argument is that coercion from the 
center has played the principal role in the cohesion of Afghanistan as it is. His assertion is 
that the right to rule was “established by conquest” that created a “professional” ruling class 
and a subject population lacking military or “political involvement.” Historically, competition 
for “supreme power” has come from within the dynastic elite or from the invaders. Barfield’s 
thesis is that rulers have found it “easiest to maintain their legitimacy and authority” when the 
political structure is “least open to competition” and competition comes from a “limited 
number of contenders.”   
However, when the political system is more open and there are more contenders for power, 
the resulting struggles, in the absence of an alternative system, have “threatened to disrupt 
society.” This thesis is useful as a starting point and is helpful in explaining Afghanistan’s 
openly chaotic politics during the “democratic experiment” in the 1960s and after the 
communist takeover in 1978 (Rubin 1992, 77–99). Nonetheless, Barfield is somewhat 
sweeping in his assertion in light of the last king Zahir Shah’s tenuous reign in Kabul for 
forty years (1933–1973). Zahir Shah came to the throne, aged 19, after his father, Nadir Shah, 
was assassinated. King Zahir’s cousin, Daud Khan, presided over a republic over a five-year 
period that was extremely turbulent, with much more turbulence to come after the April 1978 
coup in which Daud and several members of his family were assassinated. Through much of 
the twentieth century at least, large areas of Afghanistan were administered by local chiefs 
and warlords.  
Respected or feared, they managed their communities, but acknowledged the king in whose 
name formal decisions were made. This system often brought conflicting interests to the fore. 
The inability of the central government to deliver public goods in a vast country with rugged 
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mountains, remote and diverse communities, poor communication and transport made it 
difficult to rule in any case. As Barfield acknowledged elsewhere in the book, when state 
authority was challenged, the state resorted to a range of weapons short of direct rule. In fact, 
the center of power left plenty of room for maneuver and accommodation with local chiefs.  
Barfield is right, though, in identifying the sources of resistance when governments in Kabul 
have attempted to introduce social change: rural inhabitants in general and Islamic clerics in 
particular. Both see change as a “threat to their traditional way of life” (339). Women’s 
rights, secular education and the primacy of state law over customary law are the most 
contentious issues. There is a pattern of them returning whenever reform has been tried. The 
West’s support for Islamist groups after the 1978 communist coup in Kabul and during the 
Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s is a salutary lesson in how immediate 
geopolitical considerations can lead to unintended consequences, of which a violent culture is 
one.  
Extremism and violence, once they have taken root, become deeply embedded in a culture. 
The 1990s phase of the Afghan conflict illustrated this. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks 
on the United States and the Bush administration’s retaliation, the war further illustrated the 
stubbornness of the “culture of violence.” A prominent characteristic of such a culture reveals 
that attempts by the dominant international military force to subdue the insurgents by 
applying greater coercion encounter a higher level of resistance and different tactics by the 
other side, ensuring continuation of war.  
Iraq:  
[See Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bibliographic Essay, 171–174.]  
In some ways, Iraq in 2003 was a very different country compared to Afghanistan just before 
invasion in 2001, or even in 1992, when Najibullah’s regime collapsed a few months after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless in some crucial respects, there were also 
similarities between Afghanistan and Iraq. Both had suffered from years of war; an 
increasingly ruthless elite with a narrow power base had emerged as a result of internal 
conflict in each country; power was concentrated around Saddam Hussain and a narrow circle 
of people he trusted, thereby weakening state institutions. The U.S. administrator Paul 
Bremer formally disbanded the Iraqi state structure in 2003; there were many disaffected 
groups; and eagle-eyed external players were important.  
These similarities were useful for me to (i) explain the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 
context of U.S. foreign policy during and after the Cold War, (ii) provide a new analysis of 
the interaction of internal and external actors, and (iii) explain how these conflicts created a 
“culture of violence” in which violent groups found refuge and the consequences thereof.  
Modern Iraq, like Afghanistan, also has been subjected to repeated invasions. There is a vast 
amount of literature on the history of Iraq. It was once part of Mesopotamia, including 
northeastern Syria, southeastern Turkey and southwestern Iran. Situated around the Tigris-
Euphrates river system, Mesopotamia was a cradle of civilization whose origins go back 
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more than six thousand years (Preston e-book). Wealth made it a target for invasions. When 
the First World War broke out in 1914, Mesopotamia was part of the Ottoman Empire. With 
its collapse, Britain took over the territory to administer it under a League of Nations 
mandate. Oil was found in the 1920s. Gareth Stansfield (2007) and Charles Tripp (2007) have 
written about rebellions and political upheavals thereafter, and the creation of an independent 
state of Iraq in 1932. The pro-West monarchy was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1958, and 
Iraq was under dictatorship until Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled in the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion. Iraq was involved in two wars before 2003: against Iran (1980–1988) and what is 
known as the First Gulf War (1990–1991), when Saddam’s forces briefly occupied Kuwait, 
but were evicted by a U.S.-led coalition, authorized by the United Nations (Farouk-Sluglett & 
Sluglett 2001). Thereafter, Iraq remained under severe international sanctions during the rest 
of Saddam Hussein’s regime (Koshy 1995).  
These sanctions were imposed by the UN Security Council (Resolutions 661, August 6, 1990; 
687, April 3, 1991). After Iraq’s defeat in 1991, it became increasingly clear in subsequent 
years that the Clinton administration in Washington wanted the sanctions to continue, 
notwithstanding the progress made by the UN weapons inspectors with regard to Saddam 
Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction program. As Koshy has argued, the objective was 
achieved by offering differing interpretations of the Security Council resolutions and many 
new American demands made on Iraq (2985).   
In that light, my submission looks at the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and its consequences in 
the book Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq has been called both an 
“old and a new nation” (Russell 1955, 72–75). That perceptive observation, made in the mid-
twentieth century, continues to be true in the twenty-first (Dawisha 2011). Wealth has 
brought industrialization. However, the tribal system of Arab Sunnis is alive and well; 
majority Shi‘a communities, of which there are many more in the south, and Kurds in the 
north, maintain their traditional ways in the vast countryside (Dodge 2005, 101–130).
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 Iraq 
continues to draw the attention of great powers and its neighbors.  
From the early 1990s until the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, Iraq was 
viewed as a threat to U.S. interests. This is in contrast to the 1980s when, although a Soviet 
ally, Iraq was supported by Washington in the war against Iran, following the Islamic 
Revolution. It was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that brought a fundamental change in 
America’s thinking. For just as the Cold War and the Soviet threat had ended, a new threat 
had emerged to pro-U.S. oil states, most notably to Saudi Arabia and the wider Gulf region. 
There could be more challenges to come. For this reason, the course of American policy in 
the 1990s is an important area of inquiry. My book, Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, looks at what ultimately transpired in the form of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and 
its aftermath.  
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See, in particular, chapter 6 titled “The Social Meaning of Land: State, Shaikh and Peasant” in Toby Dodge’s 
book Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied.  
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That Iraq’s minority Arab Sunnis had supremacy over the Shi‘a majority and the Kurdish 
minority in the Ottoman period, under the British mandate, and even after, has been widely 
discussed by scholars (Anderson & Stanfield 2004; Phillips 2006; Tripp 2007). Sunni 
domination was a fact about the political elite. Anderson and Stanfield have pointed out that 
Sunni control was even more pronounced at the local level (20) and was always at the cost of 
Iraq’s Shi‘a population and ethnic Kurds, who were Sunni but otherwise a people distinct 
from the Arabs. Tripp and Dodge have both suggested that this was a major structural fault in 
Iraqi society, posing a continuous challenge to the government’s legitimacy. During the 
British mandate and the monarchy, once Iraq had been granted independence in 1932, 
violence was increasingly used to deal with such structural faults. This historical background 
is relevant to study how a culture of violence has developed in Iraq over many decades.  
The British, who knew they had neither the money nor soldiers to control the Iraqi 
population, had resorted to the “coercive power of airplanes,” that delivered governance from 
“two hundred feet, in the shape of regular bombing and machine-gun fire” (Dodge, 158). 
Under Saddam Hussein’s rule, the use of violence reached a new peak. In the thirteen-year 
period of sanctions and air-exclusion zones, he learned to form a “shadow state” that was the 
real “nexus of power” formed of “close associates, clients, associates, circles of exclusion and 
privilege emanating from the office and person of the president” (Tripp, 259).   
My case in analyzing Iraq is that by 2003 the Iraqi state stood on a very narrow base, with 
pressures from outside and internal opposition which was crushed by extreme coercion. Once 
the Saddam Hussein regime had been overthrown, the dissolution of the Iraqi state structure 
by the U.S.-led occupying powers destroyed the institutions, left a void and encouraged 
hitherto suppressed non-state groups, creating new entities to fill the void. Attempts to 
subdue them only caused those groups to employ more violent means, resulting in escalation 
in conflict, a much more fragile state, its ability to maintain order diminished.  
The Case for the Published Works to be Regarded as a Coherent Body of Work:  
Breeding Ground looks at how the actions of internal players, together with regional and 
great powers, created an environment that turned Afghanistan into a society which would 
give rise to an extremist group like the Taliban, and provide sanctuary for an extremist 
network like al Qaeda, and how these contributed to the phenomenon of terrorism. The 
analysis of the Afghan War in Breeding Ground seeks to demonstrate that the phenomenon of 
terrorism results from an environment of conflict that develops in four distinct, overlapping, 
phases: (1) internal unrest, (2) great power involvement, (3) state disintegration and (4) 
foreign indifference and the rise of extremism. I argue that violence replicates through these 
stages, and, as state institutions disintegrate, new violent players form in the vacuum left. 
This is what happened in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and the United States returned 
to intervene after the September 11, 2001 attacks––more than a decade after the U.S. proxy 
war against the Soviet Union had ended. Breeding Ground makes the point in conclusion that 
parallels can be seen in Palestine, Lebanon and other places, where social and institutional 
frailties, together with foreign intervention, conspire to trigger a cycle of violence that, in 
time, becomes part of societal culture (141).  
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Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan is the sequel to Breeding Ground in 
historical terms. Overcoming the Bush Legacy evaluates the Bush administration’s foreign 
policy in terms of the “war on terror.” It traces its origins to America’s domestic political 
scene, in particular the neoconservative agenda of the 1990s and inscribed in the Project for 
the New American Century. America’s interests and motives as envisaged during the Bush 
administration are analyzed; its actions are examined; and an attempt is made to assess their 
short- and long-term consequences. Overcoming the Bush Legacy looks at the extension of 
war to Iraq and America’s militaristic foreign policy using the umbrella of the “war on 
terrorism.”  
The two books are linked as explained above, but they were written in different 
circumstances. Breeding Ground is based on my research as a DPhil student at the University 
of Sussex (2002–2007). My approach in Breeding Ground is a result of being in an academic 
environment, though the presentation is for informed general readers, as well as students of 
international politics. Overcoming the Bush Legacy focuses on a relatively shorter period of 
less than a decade and evaluates George W. Bush’s presidency.  
Original and Distinctive Contribution:  
Each of the two books in my submission relies heavily on archival material, as explained 
above and listed in Appendix A. The extent to which these archives have been used is one 
distinctive aspect of my submission, and has enabled the distinctive features of my argument.  
 The first of these is a new synthesis of the Afghan and Iraq wars in the context of U.S. 
foreign policy during and after the Cold War.     
There is a discernible tendency among policymakers and academic scholars to suggest a 
separation between the Soviet-era and the post-Soviet period in international relations and 
thus American policy. Walter Russell Mead (2002, 264–309, 335–338) wrote about the rise 
and retreat of the new world order and claimed that the world of American foreign policy 
changed again after September 11, 2001. Others (Scott and Crothers 1998, 1–2) have focused 
on changes in the reference points and purposes of the United States in the post-Soviet world. 
This leads to inferences that while the Soviet Union was the main threat to the West before 
the dissolution of the USSR, it was replaced by a new threat posed by radical Islam and rogue 
states (Litwak 2000, 238–255). Such interpretations have been used to justify American 
policy during the “war on terror” after September 11, 2001 in particular.   
My published works, in particular Overcoming the Bush Legacy, show this to be an overly 
simplistic approach. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the first Gulf War thereafter, 
demonstrated to the Americans the threat posed by Arab nationalism, largely secular in 
character, although that nationalism overlapped with Islamist opposition. It was not new. The 
U.S.-Islamist alliance went back to the Carter-Reagan presidencies (even before), whose 
politics were themselves influenced by America’s Christian Right. I have described al 
Qaeda’s and the Taliban’s anti-Western ideology as a “grotesque mirror image” of the Carter 
and Reagan-George H.W. Bush administrations’ anti-Soviet policy (Breeding Ground, 128). 
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America’s close alliance with Saudi Arabia, a fundamentalist Islamic kingdom, continues, 
and Sunni Islamist groups have fought regimes in Libya, Syria and Iran with U.S. support.  
The American response to the challenge began with the 1992 Wolfowitz document, a neo-
Reaganite version of U.S. policy adapted to the post-Soviet international environment, with 
objectives similar to those during the Cold War. It became the foundation for the Project for 
the New American Century in the late 1990s and the George W. Bush administration’s 
policy.  
 Explains how these wars created a “culture of violence” providing sanctuaries for 
violent groups.    
I have explained in Breeding Ground how a “culture of violence” evolves in stages (17–20). 
It begins with internal or local unrest (the 1978 communist coup in Afghanistan; the 1990 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). In the next stage, great powers become involved on behalf of one 
local actor or another. In Afghanistan, it began in the form of a prolonged race for influence 
between the Soviet Union and the United States well before 1978. After the communist 
takeover in April 1978, and to a larger extent upon the Soviet invasion in December 1979, 
Afghanistan became a theater for a bitter Cold War conflict. By the early 1990s, the Soviet 
state had collapsed, the last Afghan communist leader, Najibullah, had fallen and the state 
institutions had disintegrated. It signified the phase of state disintegration, followed by the 
final stage in the evolution of a “culture of violence”––foreign indifference and rise of 
extremism. The United States switched its attention to other parts of the world, but returned 
to Afghanistan after September 11, 2001. Other regional actors––Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, India––remained involved. The level of violence continued to be high after America 
removed the Taliban regime in Kabul.    
• Provides a new analysis of interactions between internal and external players and their 
wider consequences.   
Interactions between actors are driven by their interests and motives. Afghanistan had been a 
buffer between Russian and Western interests in Pakistan and the Indian Ocean. With the 
Soviet Union coming to dominate Afghanistan in the last phase of the Cold War and the 
United States’ determination to challenge the Soviets, Afghanistan was transformed into a 
battleground. The scene was set for alliances between Islamist groups and the United States, 
particularly during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, whose own political base included 
America’s powerful Christian Right. In the 1980s, hostility to the Soviet Union was all 
important for the coalition of Islamic fundamentalists and rightwing Christians. A number of 
anti-Soviet leaders in the Arab world, Pakistan and China, joined the U.S.-led alliance against 
the Soviets in the Afghan War.  
As the Soviet military retreated, so did the American interest in Afghanistan decline. Other 
concerns, such as managing the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse and neutralizing the 
threat from Saddam Hussein, turned America’s attention elsewhere. That shift generated a 
domino effect. Many in the Arab and Muslim world began to view the United States as using, 
then abandoning the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and then turning against Saddam Hussein, 
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with whom many Muslims sympathized for standing up to the West. While support for 
Saddam among Muslim rulers was scant, it was significant in the population in general. 
Afghan and foreign Mujahideen and their Taliban successors felt betrayed. The damage to 
any good will and empathy for the West was a key factor contributing to the “culture of 
violence.” Once Iraq’s state institutions had been dismantled immediately and suddenly 
following the U.S.-led invasion, there was little sympathy for the occupying forces among the 
country’s powerful groups. There was a long history to remind them of foreign invasions and 
resistance against occupation forces.  
My analysis of Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that in both countries, indeed elsewhere in the 
region, actors have a tendency to make the most of great power interventions. Local players 
let external powers remove authoritarian rulers (who may have been propped up by foreign 
players) and pay a high price in conditions they cannot do much to control. In the end, 
intervening foreign forces encounter resistance which makes permanent control of a country 
difficult.  
Scholarly Endorsements and Reviews:  
The two books have attracted comment from scholars and reviews have been published in 
academic journals. In his foreword to Breeding Ground, Richard Falk writes that the book 
“incisively narrates the several generations of recent Afghan conflict and turmoil, and calls 
our attention to several crucial features of the Afghan reality often disregarded by past 
foreign intervenors” (Foreword, xiv). Falk observes that Tripathi offers a “non-ideological” 
assessment of the overall situation in Afghanistan, including its regional setting; and depicts 
the manner by which the cumulative effects of foreign intervention have generated “a culture 
of violence” in the country. It represents an “ethos of terrorism that has been adopted by all 
participants in the conflict that constantly blurs the boundaries between warfare and 
massacre.”  
Marjorie Cohn, professor at Thomas Jefferson Law School, is among those who have 
reviewed Breeding Ground. In George Mason University’s History News Network (August 
22, 2011), Cohn writes: “Breeding Ground makes a significant contribution toward 
understanding the origins and triggers of terrorism.” She says that the book traces the 
development of a “culture of violence” in Afghanistan due to resistance against foreign 
invasions. Without such historical insight, Cohn adds, efforts to make us safe from acts of 
terror will prove futile.  
Cohn’s review goes through the narrative of the final phase of the Cold War (1980s), the rise 
of the Taliban and al Qaeda (1990s) and the conduct of the “war on terror” in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on America. She concludes that one of the significant things to 
come out of Breeding Ground is an explanation as to how rather than endearing us to the 
people in the Muslim world, Washington’s policies “incur hatred against the United States.”  
Survival, journal of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, says that in his analysis of 
the 1979–89 Soviet war in Afghanistan and after, Tripathi examines “how the conflict 
ultimately transformed Afghanistan into a sanctuary for terrorism.” It notes that the book 
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argues that the West should “abandon its current ‘strong-arm tactics’ and focus on 
development and reconstruction.” (Brief Notices, Survival October-November 2011, 212).  
Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan has a foreword by the MIT political 
scientist, John Tirman. Tirman comments on the author’s approach to evaluate George W. 
Bush’s presidency in terms of the “war on terror,” its origins and consequences. “The strategy 
of war against Iraq and Afghanistan was, as Tripathi rightly focuses on, the centerpiece of his 
global war on terror,” writes Tirman (Foreword, xi). Calling the book “a terse treatment,” 
(xii) he concludes: “That now we have Deepak Tripathi’s sharply reasoned account of this 
catastrophe––its origins, and its consequences––will serve as a powerful warning for 
generations to come.”  
In the Antigonish Review (Spring 2011), journal of St. Francis Xavier University in Canada, 
Wilf Cude looks at Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan, together with War 
of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (Simon & Schuster, 2009) by the 
veteran U.S. diplomat Richard N. Haass. Wilf Cude’s review is titled “Insider and Outsider: 
Converging Views on Iraq and Afghanistan” (103 –107). Cude finds the “definitive insider’s 
account” by Haass and the “definitive outsider’s assessment” by Tripathi “offering 
independently of one another a remarkably convergent vision of what is emerging as the 
worst blunder of American foreign policy since Vietnam.” Cude writes that Tripathi 
examines the same salient events as Haass (leading to the invasion of Iraq). However, what 
Cude finds noteworthy is the book’s greater focus upon the “background political and 
cultural environments generating and exacerbating those events, beginning with the post-
Reagan rise of neoconservatives that brought George W. Bush to power.” Cude calls the book 
“a grim sketch of the Bush Legacy” ––with “Afghanistan in ruins, with nominal governments 
hopelessly ineffective, with hundreds of thousands dead and perhaps millions displaced, and 
with every prospect of both nations continuing a sinkhole for American and allied military.” 
In the Cambridge Journal of American Studies (2011, vol. 45 no. 2, 404–405), Jon Roper has 
reviewed Overcoming the Bush Legacy. In Roper’s view, the book is “no less an indictment 
of the consequences of Bush’s decisions than it is a survey of how his administration came to 
believe that political problems can be solved by military action.” The book “argues 
convincingly that their (Bush administration’s) response was not only predictable but also 
ultimately self-defeating.” And Roper writes that Tripathi is “most at home in describing the 
complex web of religious and political groups that opposed the United States military as it 








Use of archival material (documents, information and memoirs included)  
See first Breeding Ground endnotes, 171–201 (in order of use):  
Discussion on literature and culture of violence: chapters 1 & 2   
National Security Archive: chapters 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, Afterword  
Cold War International History Project: chapters 4, 5, 6, 10  
U.S. Federal Reserve Division: chapter 3   
Carter Presidential Library: chapters 7, 11   
Robert Gates (CIA Director): chapters 7, 8   
Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf (Pakistan ISI): chapters 7, 8, 9   
Zbigniew Brzezinski (U.S. National Security Adviser): chapter 7   
Reagan Presidential Library: chapters 8, 9   
Russian General Staff Postmortem (trans., ed. Lester Grau)/Soviet-Afghan War: chapter 8   
Colonel Jalali & Grau/Mujahideen Account (Other Side of the Mountain): chapter 8   
NATO-Russia Archive (Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security): chapter 11    
Private conversations: chapters 4, 10   
Project for the New American Century: chapter 11  
UK Government Report: “Responsibility for Terrorist Atrocities”: chapter 14   
Avalon Project (Yale Law School): chapter 14 
 
See Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan endnotes, 171–201   
Cursor: Dossier on civilian victims of U.S. aerial bombing of Afghanistan: Prologue  
Federal Election Commission: 2000 election result: chapter 1 
Project for the New American Century: chapter 1 
U.S. National Security Council: National Security Strategy 2002: chapter 1  
Congressional Research Service: chapters 1, 2, 7    
Avalon Project: chapters 2, 3  
Bush Presidential Papers: chapter 2  
CIA World Factbook 2001: chapter 2  
UN: chapters 3, 4  
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UK Government Report: “Responsibility for Terrorist Atrocities”: chapter 3   
Jane’s Intelligence Review: chapter 3   
Human Rights Watch: chapters 3, 6  
U.S. National Archive: chapters 4, 7 
Russian General Staff Postmortem (trans., ed. Lester Grau)/Soviet-Afghan War: chapter 4  
Official Account of London Bombing, July 7, 2005: chapter 4  
Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf (Pakistan ISI): chapter 4  
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: British Government Assessment: chapter 5  
NSA: Curveball Affair: chapter 5 
Iraq Body Count: chapter 5  
Dick Marty: Council of Europe Report on Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of 
Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member-States, Second Report: chapter 6   
Amnesty : chapter 6 
Reprieve: chapter 6  
Taguba Report: Investigation of the 800
th
 Military Police Brigade (Abu Ghraib): chapter 6  
NATO–Russia Archive: chapter 7   
ArmsControl.Org: chapter 7   
Strobe Talbott (U.S.): chapter 7   
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